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THE RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
APPLICABLE TO BILLS AND NOTES.
III. INTERPRETATION AND OBLIGATION.*
B. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS.
4. MATURITY.
The difference between the Anglo-American law and that
of the Hague Convention relating to maturity or to the day of
payment concerns, in the main, legal holidays and days of
grace.91 Between countries having different calendars a ques-
tion may arise also regarding the law that shall fix the maturity
of the instrument.
Whatever difference of opinion there may be concerning the
doctrine of the independence of the different contracts, all are
agreed that the date of maturity must be determined alike with
respect to all parties. The time of payment being a term of the
original contract, all supervening parties must be deemed to have
contracted upon the basis of that contract. The question is there-
fore whether the lex loci contractus or the lex loci solutionis
of the bill or note shall govern.
a. English Law: Article 72 (5) provides:
"Where a bill is drawn in one country and is payable in an-
other, the due date thereof is determined according to the law
of the place where it is payable."
b. American Law: It has been uniformly held that the ex-
istence of days of grace is to be determined in accordance with
the place of payment of the bill or note. 92
*Continued from 1 MInN-ESOTA LAW REvIEw, p. 338.
91. Days of grace are still allowed in England. B. E. A. Sec. 14.
92. Bank of Washington v. Triplett, (1828) 1 Pet. 25, 7 L. Ed. 37;
Vaughan v. Potter, (1907) 131 11. App. 334; Thorp v. Craig, (1860)
10 Ia. 461; Vidal v. Thompson, (1822) 11 Mart. (La.) 23; Hammond
v. American Express Co., (1908) 107 Md. 295, 68 Atl. 496: Burnham v.
Webster, (1841) 19 Me. 232; Cribbs v. Adams, (1859) 13 Gray 597;
Bank of Orange County v. Colby, (1842) 12 N. H. 520; Bowen v.
Newell, (1855) 13 N. Y. 290; Pawcatuck Nat. Bank v. Barber, (1900)
22 R. 1. 73, 46 Atl. 1095; Bryant v. Edson, (1836) 8 Vt. 325; 30 Am.
Dec. 472: Walsh v. Dart, (1860) 12 Wis. 709; Second Nat. Bank v.
Smith, (1903) 118 Wis. 18, 94 N. W. 664.
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c. German Law: The law of the place of payment governs
in general. 3 Article 34 of the General Exchange Law contains
-an express provision on the subject of calendars, which has the
following wording:
"If a bill, payable after date within the Empire (Inland), be
drawn in a country reckoning by the old style, and there be no
statement thereon, that the bill is dated after the new style, or, if
such bill be dated according to both styles, the date of maturity is
to be reckoned according to the day of the calendar of the new
style which corresponds with the day of drawing according to
the old style."
This article applies the calendar of the place of issue but it
deals only with the case where a bill is drawn on Germany from
a country having the old style and is piyable after date. If the
bill is payable on a particular day, the German calendar controls."-
W rhere a bill payable after date is drawn in Germany on a coun-
try with the old style, the rule contained in Article 34 is not ap-
plied by way of analogy and the date of maturity is determined
in accordance with the calendar at the place of payment. a5
d. Italian Law: There is no provision in the Italian codes
on the subject. Most of the Italian authors9 apply the law of
the place of issue where the calculation of the date of maturity
depends-upon the question of a difference in the calendars.
The. law and juristic opinion of the different countries agree
that the law of the place of payment should determine the day
of payment when the day of maturity falls on a Sunday or a
legal holiday.97 The same agreement exists also in the matter
of days of grace, which are controlled by the same law.98 Most
93. R.G. Dec. 11, 1895 (6 Niemeyer 429). In this case a bill was
drawn from Germany on Portugal, payable three months after date.
The question involved was whether the three months should be under-
stood as calendar months or as ninety days.
Art. 35 of the German Exchange Act has the following provision:
"Bills payable at a fair or market become due in accordance with
the local law of the fair or market place, and, failing such fixed date,
on the day before the legal close of the fair or market. If the fair or
market lasts for one day only, the bill becomes due on that day."
94. Staub, Art. 34, Sec. 4.
95. Staub, Art. 34, Sec. 5.
96. See Ottolenghi, p. 276.
97. Von Bar, p. 674; Diena, III, p. 147; Champcommunal, Annales,
1894, II, p. 204; Esperson, p. 90; Griinhut, II, p. 585; Lyon-Caen et
Renault, IV, p. 563; Ottolenghi, p. 268.
98. Audinet, p. 614; von Bar, p. 674; Champcommunal, Annales,
1894, II, pp. 204-205; Beauchet, Annales, 1888, p. 69; Chr6tien, p. 148;
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of the authors feel the question involved in the above cases does
not affect the maturity of the instrument in any true sense what-
ever, but only the precise day or incidents of payment, and like
all matters affecting payment, should be subject to the law of the
place of payment.9 As the question is closely connected with the
business usages and policies existing at the place of payment, the
law of the place of payment should control in the nature of
things and every party must be regarded as having contracted
with reference to the law there existing. 10°
Great diversity of opinion pxists, however, in regard to the
question of calendars. Some authors are of the opinion that the
question affects the substance of the original contract so that the
law of the place of issue should control.' 01  Others bring it within
the operation of the lex loci solutionis of the bill or note on the
alleged ground that it relates to the performance of the con-
tract.10 2 The law of the place of payment of the bill or note has
been accepted also by the Bills of Exchange Act and by the Con-
vention of the Hague. 0 3 As this rule appears to conform also
to the practice of bankers, it should be adopted by the Uniform
Act.1
04
5. PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE.
a. English Law: The Bills of Exchange Act provides that
"the duties of the holder with respect to presentment for accept-
Despagnet, p. 994; Esperson, p. 90; Diena, III, p. 150; Griinhut, II,
p. 585; Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 563; Mass6, I, p. 571; Rolin, II,
No. 963; Surville et Arthuys, pp. 680-81; Ottolenghi, pp. 290-91; Weiss,
IV, p. 465.
99. See, for example, Griinhut, II, p. 585; Ottolenghi, p. 290.
100. Contra, Staub, Art. 86, Secs. 1, 9, who contends that the allow-
ance of days of grace would change the day of maturity.
101. Audinet, p. 614; Champcommunal, Annales, 1894, II, p. 201,
Chr~tien, p. 142; Jitta, II, pp. 81, 111; Surville et Arthuys, pp. 676-77;
Despagnet, p. 994.
102. Von Bar, p. 675; Esperson, p. 89; Griinhut, II, p. 585; Lyon-Caen
et Renault, IV, p. 563; Mass6, I, pp. 570-71; Weiss, IV, pp. 465-66.
Compare Diena, III, pp. 144-46; Ottolenghi, pp. 265-66.
103. Art. 36, Uniform Law.
104. Where the day of payment is a certain time after date the actual
date must, of course, be understood.
"As regards the calendar," says von Bar, "we must start with this
consideration, that the person who issues the bill imposes its con-
.ditions, and these he must express in the way in which they will be
most easily understood at the place of payment. That is effected by
fixing the day of payment according to the calendar that is in use at
the place of payment. The matter stands otherwise if the day of
payment is fixed at the expiration of a particular period from the date
of the bill. The date is the day on which the bill is truly completed,
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ance . . . are determined by the law of the place where the act
is done or the bill is dishonoured."'10 5
b. American Law: It has been held that the right of imme-
diate recourse for non-acceptance is subject to the law governing
the contract of the party sought to be charged. 10 6 While no cases
have been found respecting the duty of presentment for accept-
ance, the same law will doubtless apply.
c. French Law: The provisions of the French code are
admitted by the French writers themselves to be illogical and
indefensible.10 7 According to Article 160 of the Commercial
Code the time for presentment of drafts payable after sight
drawn in France on a foreign country is determined by French
law, which governs likewise where a draft is drawn in a foreign
country on France.
d. Italian Law: The only relevant provision of the Italian
law is contained in Section 261 of the -Commeicial Code which
provides that when, during times of maritime war, a sight draft
is drawn in Italy on a foreign country, the time of presentment
for acceptance shall be double the ordinary period. Ottolenghi 0 8
is of the opinion that this. section accepts the law of the place
where the contract is made as controlling the time within which
presentment for acceptance must be made.
Of the text writers the older authors regarded the duty of the
holder to present the instrument for acceptance and the time of
such presentment as a part of the performance of the exchange
contract, and as subject, therefore, to the law of the place where
the presentment was to be made. 0 9 Today the jurists generally
agree in looking upon the question as one affecting the obligation
of the various contracts, as distingnished from their perform-
ance. According to this view the lex loci contractus of the in-
dividual contracts would determine the duties of the holder." 0
not the day, which is described by the same title in another calendar,
but is, of course, a different day altogether." P. 675.
105. B. E. A. Sec. 72 (3).
106. Aymar v. Sheldon, (1834) 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 439, 27 Am. Dec. 137.
107. See Despagnet, p. 994; Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 562.
108. P. 183.
109. Pothier, Du Contrat de Change, No. 155.
110. Audinet, p. 615: Champcommunal, Annales, 1894, II, p. 152;
Diena, III, pp. 110, 113-14; Jitta, II, p. 91; Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV,
p. 562- Ottc'e-ghi. pp. 165-66.
Fio-e still f-7,--. the law of the place of payment of the bill or
note. Fiore, I, p. 164.
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A number of authors, in a desire to have one law govern this
question, suggest, however, that the law of the drawer's contract
should control."' This is also the recommendation of the Insti-
tute of International Law. 1 2 As each party is free to stipulate
in regard to the question before us, it would seem clear upon
principle that it affects the obligation of contracts, that is, the con-
ditions upon which each individual contract was made. The lex
loci contractus of the different parties should be adopted, there-
fore, by the Uniform Act as the rule governing the necessity and
time of presentment for acceptance, unless considerations of pol-
icy require a deviation from strict theory. A strict adherence to
the doctrine of the independence of the different contracts may
lead here to the result that the presentment may be sufficient as
to some parties and insufficient as to others, so that the rights of
recourse of the former against the latter may be cut off. Because
of this fact a single law has been advocated. Many authors, as
well as the Institute of International Law, favor, as we have seen,
the lex loci contractus of the drawer's contract. The Bills of
Exchange Act, on the other hand, has adopted "the law of the
place where the act is done, or the bill is dishonoured." Mass6 1"
would distinguish between the necessity and the time of present-
ment and would apply the lex loci contractus of each contract
with regard to the necessity of presentment and the lex loci con-
tractus of the drawer's contract as regards the time of present-
ment.
If a single law must be found the author would prefer the
rule of the Bills of Exchange Act. A comparative study of
the law of Bills and Notes of England and the United States and
that of the Convention of the Hague has not 'convinced him,
however, of the necessity of a departure from principle. The
two systems agree as to the necessity of presentment except that
the Bills of Exchange Act" 4 and the Negotiable Instruments
Law"' require a presentment for acceptance also in the relatively
infrequent case where the bill is drawn payable elsewhere than
at the residence or place of business of the drawee. As regards
the time within which presentment must be made, the Anglo-
111. Audinet. p. 612; Champcommunal, Annales. 1894, II, p. 152;
Chr~tien, p. 122; Esperson, pp. 41-45; Surville et Arthuys, p. 677.
112. Annuaire, VIII, p. 122, Resolution IV.
113. 1, p. 570.
114. Sec. 39 (2).
115. N. I. L. Sec. 143 (3).
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American law prescribes a reasonable time,'1 6 while that of the
Convention of the Hague" 7 lays down the definite period of six
months. No serious differences exist, therefore, between the
two systems from which untoward results might be feared in
consequence of the strict application of the doctrine of the in-
dependence of the different contracts. Under these circum-
stances no actual hardship is imposed upon the holder.
The lex loci contractus of the different contracts determines
also the question whether the holder can safely accept a qualified
acceptance. 1 8 The point involved is again whether the drawer
or indorser has agreed to be responsible in such a case. The same
law must control the right of recovery for non-acceptance." 9
Everything connected with the mode of presentment for ac-
ceptance is governed, on the other hand, by the law of the place
where such presentment is to be made. The question also
whether an acceptance, once given, may be revoked is determined
by this law."20 It will decide likewise, in the nature of things,
the duty of the drawee to accept. 121
6. PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT AND NOTICE.
Important differences continue to exist between Anglo-
American law and that of the Hague Convention as regards the
requirements of protest and notice. What is the law that should
govern in this-matter. : -
a. The Necessity of Presentment, Protest and Notice. The
law governing the necessity of presentment for acceptance has
been discussed already." 2 The requirement of protest and notice
116. N. I. L. Sec. 144; B. E. A. Sec. 40 (1)
117. Art. 22, Uniform Law.
118. Diena, III, p. 124; Griinhut, II; p. 580; Ottolenghi, p. 199. Con-
tra: Champcommunal, Annales, 1894, II, p. 156, who applies the lex
domicilii of the acceptor.
119. Aymar v. Sheldon, (1834) 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 439; 27 Am. Dec.
137; Diena, III, p. 133; Esperson, p. 67; Ottolpnghil No. 79.
120. Chrdtien, p. 129; Ottolenghi, p. 197.
121. Audinet, p. 612; Diena, III, pp. 118-119, 193; Lyon-Caen et
Renault, IV, p. 558; Ottolenghi, p. 191; Weiss, IV, pp. 442, 460.
122. A wide difference existed formerly between Anglo-American
and Continental law in the right of recourse upon the non-acceptance
of a bill. Such a right was denied generally upon the continent, the
holder being entitled only to security that the bill would be paid at
maturity. The Convention of the Hague has accepted the Anglo-
American view in this regard.
The question was regarded as relating to the obligation of the
different parties and as subject, therefore, to the lex loci contractus
of the drawer's or indorser's contract. Audinet, pp. 620-21; Chr6tien,
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of dishonor in case of non-acceptance may be considered in this
connection.
Three different views have been expressed concerning the
law governing the necessity of presentment for payment and the
necessity of protest and notice upon dishonor, for non-acceptance
or non-payment.
First view: These requirements are to be regarded as a part
of the obligation of the contract of the different parties, that is,
as conditions upon which they have agreed to pay. According
to this view the lex loci of each contract should govern the ques-
tion. This rule has the sanction of the French, 12
3 German'24 and
Italian 125 courts. It represents also the majority doctrine in this
country12 and is supported by the great weight of judicial opinion
everywhere. 127
Second view: The law of the place of payment controls as
to all parties. This is the view of the Bills of Exchange Act.
Section 72 (3) reads as follows:
"The duties of the holder with respect to presentment for
acceptance or payment and the necessity for, or sufficiency of a
protest or notice of dishonour, or otherwise, are determined by
the law of the place where the act 2 8 is done or the bill is dis-
honoured."
With respect to protest the view expressed in the above sec-
tion was followed by some of the old authors, who regarded the
question as relating to the performance of the original contract
p. 135; Diena, III, p. 133; Esperson, pp. 67-68; Lyon-Caen et Renault,
IV, pp. 559-60.
123. Trib. de Com. de la Seine, Apr. 6, 1875 (3 Clunet 103).
124. Staub, Art. 86, Sees. 5-9.
125. Cass. Florence, Apr. 8, 1895 (S. 1896, 4, 7), cited by Audinet, p.
618, note.
126. Holbrook v. Vibbard, (1840) 2 Scam. (Ill.) 465; Allen v. NMer-
chants Bank of New York, (1839) 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 215; 34 Am.
Dec. 289; Amsinck v. Rogers, (1907) 189 N. Y. 252; 82 N. E. 134;
121 Am. St. Rep. 858, 12 L. R. A. (N.S.) 875; Read v. Adams, (1821)
6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 356; Warner v. Citizens Bank of Parker, (1894)
6 So. Dak. 152, 60 N. W. 746; Douglas v. Bank of Commerce, (1896)
97 Tenn. 133, 36 S. W. 874; Raymond v. Holmes, (1853) 11 Tex. 54;
Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Canada, (1911) 188 Fed. 300.
127. Von Bar, p. 677; Asser, p. 210; Beauchet, Annales, 1888, II, p..66;
Audinet, pp. 618, 620; Despagnet, pp. 994-95: Diena, III, p. 170; Prin-
cipi, II, p. 315; Griinhut, II, p. 581; 'Mass6, I, p. 569: Meili, 11, p. 347;
Ottolenghi, pp. 366-67; Scha1ffner, p. 122; Val6ry, p. 1288.
128. Westlake suggests that the word "acts" includes also "omis-
sions." P. 330.
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and as subject, therefore, to the law of the place of payment. 29
A few of the modern writers also favor the law of the place of
payment.
1 30
Third view: The law of the place of issue of the original
contract governs as to all parties. This view is sup'ported by a
number of authors"zl and is accepted by the Institute of Inter-
national Law as regards the necessity of presentment. 13 2
In accordance with the principle of the independence of the
different contracts upon bills and notes there can be no doubt that
on principle the law governing the different contracts must de-
termine the conditions upon which each party has assumed lia-
bility. The necessity of presentment, protest and notice belongs
clearly to the obligation of the contracts of the different parties,
constituting the conditions upon which they have assumed lia-
bility, and must be subject, therefore, to the law of the place
which controls the liability of the different parties. An abandon-
ment of this rule in favor of the law of the place of payment or
of the law of the place of issue of the original contract, is tanta-
mount to a rejection of the whole doctrine of the independence
of the different contracts- The author has taken the position
that there is no sufficient reason for a complete departure from
this funddmental principle in the law of bills and notes. To his
mind the convehience of complying with a single law instead-of
satisfying the law of different jurisdictions does not justify an
overthrow of the traditional rule which regards the contracts
of the drawer and of the indorsers as indemnity contracts, per-
formable in the state where they were made.
From the standpoint of practicability the lex loci contractus
of the several contracts is free from objection in so far as the
necessity of presentment, protest and notice is concerned. Each
one of these acts is customarily done without regard to the legal
necessity for so doing, so that a rule which might impose such
a necessity by virtue of the lex loci contractus of a particular
contract would constitute no real burden.
Shall the same law determine also the question whether some
substitute for the customary protest may be allowed? Under the
129. Brocher, Cours, II, pp. 317-18; Pbthier, Trait6 du Contrat de
Change, No. 155.
130. Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 563.
131. Esperson, p. 151.
132. Annuaire, VIII, p. 122. Resolution IV.
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law of the Hague Convention each contracting state may pre-
scribe that with the assent of the holder, protests to be drawn
within its territory may be replaced by a declaration dated and
written upon the bill itself, signed by the drawee, and transcribed
in a *public register within the time fixed for protest.1 33 This
practice appears to exist in Italy and in Belgium. Some authors
would apply again the lex loci contractus of the different con-
tracts. 13 4. Others are of opinion that the law of the place where
the presentment is to be made should control.135 According to this
view the contract is interpreted as requiring only that the dishonor
of the bill or note shall be indicated in some authentic manner,
the mode of authentication being- left to the law of the place
where the act is to be done. The latter view is also that of *the
Iristitute of International Law. 3 6 The balance of convenience
is in its favor.
b. The Time and Mode of Presentment, Protest and ANo-
tice. All courts and authors as well as legislative proyisions agree
that the law of the place where the presentffhent anid protest is to
be made should determine the formalities with which .such acts
§hould be executed. All parties, including'the drawer and in-
dorser, will be deemed to have contracted with 'reference to the
law of that state. This law clearly controls the manner of present-
ment and protest. It determines for 'example, the persons by
whom presentment and protest may be made; the place where and
the time of day when such presentment may be made; and
whether a "noting" on the-day of maturity is sufficient. We
have seen in connection with the maturity of bills and notes that
the precise day of payment, where the day of maturity falls on a
Sunday or a legal holiday, or where days of grace are a llowed, is
ascertained with reference to .'the law of the place of payment.
The same rule would hold, no doubt, where the law of the place
of payment does -not recognize days of. grace, but permits pre-
sentment and protest on one of the two business days following
the day of maturity as is the case' under the Convention of the
Hague.13 7
133. Art. 9 of Convention.
134. Champcommunal" Annales, 1894, II, p. 216.
135. -Diena, III, p. 175; Griinhut, II, p. 578; Ottolenghi, pp. 368-69.
136. Annuaire, VIII, p. 122. Resolution V provides that the law of
the place where payment is to be made determines the mode of show-
ing default of acceptance or payment, and the form of protest:
137. Art. 37, Uniform Li.w.
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There is no harmony, however, concerning the law governing
the mode of notification, as to which wide differences exist be-
tween the Anglo-American law and that of the Hague Conven-
tion.13 - -
(1) English Law: Section 72 (3) of the Bills of Exchange
Act provides that' "the sufficiency of a protest or notice of dis-
honour" . . . is "determined by the law of the place where
the act is done or the bill is dishonoured." This provision follows
the decisions of Rothschild v. Curriel'9 and Hirschfield v.
Smith.""
(2) American Law: The American cases are divided upon
the question. The majority 14 ' hold that the law governing
the different contracts should control. A minority14 2 ap-
ply the law of the place of payment of the bill or note.
(3) German Law: Article 86 of the General German Ex-
change Law provides expressly:
"As regards the form of the proceedings for the exercise or
maintenance of exchange rights on a bill at a foreign place, the
local law in force decides."
138. Article 44 of the Uniform Law provides as follows:
"The holder must give notice of non-acceptance or non-payment
to his indorser and to the drawer within the four business days which
follow the day of protest or, in case of the stipulation 'return without
costs,' within the four business days which follow the presentment.
"Each indorser must within two days give notice to his indorser
of the notice which he has received, indicating the names and-ad-
dresses of those who have given the preceding notices, and thus in
succession back to the drawer. The limit of time above indicated
shall run from the receipt of the preceding notice
"In a case where an indorser has not indicated his address or has
signed in an illegal manner, it shall suffice if notice is given to the
preceding indorser.
"A party who has to give notice may do so in any form, even by
the simple return of the bill of exchange. He must prove that he
has done this within the time prescribed.
"This time limit shall be deemed to have been observed if an or-
dinary letter giving the notice has been mailed within the said time.
"The party who does not give notice within the time above indi-
cated shall not lose his right of recourse; he shall be responsible for
the injury, if any has occurred, caused by his negligence, but the
damages shall not exceed the amount of the bill of exchange."
139. (1841) 1 Q- B. 43, 4 P. & 0. 737.
140. (1866) L. R. 1 C. P. 340.
141. Snow v. Perkins- (1851) 2 Mich. 238; Thorp v. Craig, (1860)
10 Ia. 461; Raymond v. Holmes, (1853) 11 Tex. 55; Aymar v. Sheldon,
(1834) 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 439, 27 Am. Dec. 137.
142. Wooley v. Lyon, (1886) 117 11. 248, 6 N. E. 885, 57 Am. Rep.
867; Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Canada, (1911) 188 Fed. 300.
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This section is held applicable to the form and sufficiency of
notice. 4 '
Which of the above rules should be adopted by the Uniform
Law?
The reasoning of Rothschild v. Currie in favor of the law of
the place of payment of a bill or note must be rejected for the
reason that it is based upon the theory that the drawer and in-
dorsers agree to pay at the place of payment of the bill or note.
The case of Hirschfield v. Smith, however, advanced a second
reason in support of the law of the place of payment. Erle,
C. J., says : -4
"If the reason assigned in that case (Rothschild v. Currie)
be not now adopted, and if the contract of an indorser in Eng-
land of a bill accepted payable in France be held to be a contract
governed by the law of England, and so the holder be not en-
titled to sue in England such an indorser unless he has given due
notice of dishonour according to the law of England, then the
question is, what notice, under such circumstances, amounts to
due notice? . . . The indorser of a bill accepted payable
in France, promises to pay in the event of dishonour in France,
and notice thereof. By his contract he must be taken to know
the law of France, relating to the dishonour of bills; and notice
of dishonour is a p.6rtion of that law. Then, although his con-
tract is regulated br the law of England relating to indorsement,
and although he inay not be liable unless reasonable notice of
dishonouir has been sent to him, yet the notice of dishonour ac-
cording to the law of France may be, and we think ought to be,
deemed reasonable notice according to the law of England, and
,be sufficient in England to entitle the plaintiff to recover accord-
ing to that law.
"It is reasonable to hold that the foreign holder should have
time to make good his right of recourse against all the parties to
the bill, in whatever country they may be. Here the holder was
a Frenchman, in France. The indorsement to him was by the
plaintiff, a Frenchman, in France. The indorsement to the
plaintiff was by the defendant, an Englishman in England; and
the indorsement to that Englishman by Lion, the payee, may
have been in any country. The inconvenience would be great if
the holder was bound to know the place of each indorsement,
and the law of that- place relating to notice of dishonour, and
to give notice accordingly, on pain, in case of mistake, of losing
his remedy; whereas there would be great convenience to the hold-
er if notice valid according to the law of the place should be held
to be reasonable notice for each of the countries of each of
143. Staub, Art. 86, Sec. 3; Beauchet, Annales, 1888, II, p. 67, note.
144. (1866) L. R. 1 C. P. 340, 352.
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the parties, unless an exceptional case should give occasion for
an exception."
In the opinion of the learned Chief justice, therefore, even if
the indorser's contract is subject to the law of the place where
he entered the contract, the indorser must be regarded as having
contracted, as regards the sufficiency of notice, with reference to
the law of the place where the bill is payable. The same view is
strongly advocated by a late federal case, in which Judge Sanborn
uses the following language :145
"The rule that the manner of giving and the sufficiency of
the notice of dishonor are governed by the law of the place of
indorsement, is impractical, unfair, and unjust, because the notary
at the place of payment must give the notice, and it is often im-
possible in the time allowed to him by the law for him to find out
where each indorsement was made and what the law of the place
of each indorsement is upon the subject of notice of dishonor.
On the other hand, commercial paper shows on its face where it
is payable. Each indorser, when it is presented to him for his
indorsement, has time and opportunity before he signs it, to learn
where it is payable to ascertain if he desires the law of that place,
and to decide for himself with full knowledge and upon due con-
sideration whether or not he will agree to pay the amount speci-
fied therein if the maker fails to do so and the paper is presented,
the payment is demanded, the protest is made, and the notice of
dishonor is given according to that law. In the decisions upon
this question there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict. The es-
tablished rule in England, the rule in Illinois, and the stronger
and better reasons are that, where an indorsement is made in
one jurisdiction, and the commercial -paper is payable in an-
other, the manner of giving notice of dishonor and the suffi-
ciency thereof are governed by the law of the place where the
paper is payable."
The majority view in this country looks upon the sufficiency
of notice as an implied condition -upon which the liability of the
drawer and indorser is to attach and which is subject, therefore,
to the law governing their respective contracts. The foreign
writers are divided on this point. Most 4 ' of them
seem to feel that the sufficiency of notice, like the mode of
presentment and protest, should be controlled by the law of the
place of payment of the bill or note. From the standpoint of
strict theory the question differs from that touching the mode of
145. (1911) 188 Fed. 300, at p. 302.
146. Asser, p. 210; Beauchet, Annales, 1888, II, pp. 67-68; Grfinhut,'
II, p. 578; Meili, II, p. 346.
Contra and in favor of the lex loci of each contract, von Bar, p.
677; Diena, III, pp. 196-97; Ottolenghi, pp. 452-53.
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presentment and protest in that it relates not so much to the man-
ner of doing the prescribed act as to its sufficiency as notice to the
drawer and indorser. -It would affect, therefore, the obligation of
their contracts, that is, the conditions upon which liability was
assumed. It must be admitted, however, that the difference be-
tween the conditions of liability and matters affecting the mode
of performance is ultimately one of degree. As no absolute line
can be drawn, considerations of convenience may well be invoked
in the solution of the question. The writer is strongly of the
opinion that the considerations advanced by Chief Justice Erle
and Judge Sanborn are entitled to the greatest weight and that
the law of the place of payment, which is accepted by the law
of England and Germany, and by the Institute of International
Law, should be approved by the Uniform Act. The other view,
which makes it incumbent upon each holder to notify a party
whom he seeks to charge with legal liability in strict accordance
with the law governing the latter's contract, is unreasonable. As
far as the drawer and indorser is concerned the suggested rule
would not operate more to his disadvantage than the rule now
prevailing in Anglo-American law which extends the liability of
the drawer or indorser in case of delay in giving notice of dis-
honor when such delay is caused by circumstances beyond the
control of the holder which are not imputable to his default, mis-
conduct or negligence.4 7 It will follow that if the last holder is
authorized to notify all the prior parties, and he does so, accord-
ing to the law of the place of payment, their liability will be fixed.
But suppose that the holder of the instrument at the time of
maturity notifies only his immediate indorser, which law is to
determine the time and manner of notice to be given by such
indorser to the antecedent parties? The Bills of Exchange Act,
Section 72 (3), appears to say that the sufficiency of notice by
any holder is governed by the law of the place where the bill is
dishonored. But this would be opposed to the English law as
stated by the court of appeal in Horne v. Rouquette.'48 West-
lake 14 believes that this subdivision should be applied only to the
last holder, and that in all other cases, in conformity with the
general rule governing the interpretation of the drawing and
indorsement, 50 the lex loci contractus of the drawer's or in-
147. N. I. L. Sec. 115; B. E. A. Sec. 50 (1).
148. (1878) L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 514.
149. P. 321.
150. B. E. A. Sec. 72 (2).
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dorser's contract must be satisfied. Daniel,151 on the other hdnd,
is of the opinion that each intermediate indorser could notify any
prior indorser or the drawer, in accordance with the law of his
own land. The most convenient rule would be, no doubt, to
allow each party to give notice in the manner prescribed by the
law of the state where such notice is to be given. This appears
to be the meaning also of Resolution 5, paragraph 2 of the In-
stitute of International Law.1 52 The author would recommend
that the Uniform Act adopt this rule.
7. VIS MAJOR.-MORATORY LAWS.
a. Vis Major. In Anglo-American Law. any delay in pre-
sentment, protest and notice is excused 1, 2a when caused by cir-
cumstances beyond the control of the holder and not imputable
to his fault, misconduct or negligence, and such requirements
are dispensed with,1 5 3 if, after the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, they cannot be made. The Convention of the Hague al-
lows such an excuse only in case presentment or protest is pre-
vented by an insuperable obstacle (vis major) .154 Matters purely
personal to the holder or to the person intrusted with the pre-
sentment of the instrument or with the drawing of the protest
are not regarded as constituting cases of vis major.
Which is- the law governing the question whether a delay in
presentment, protest or notice is excusable?
Most authors 55 regard -the question as relating to the obliga-
tion assumed by the drawer and indorser and as subject, therefore,
to the lex loci contractus of their respective contracts. Others 15
are of the opinion that any delay in presentment, protest or notice
151. P. 1093.
152. Annuaire, VIII, p. 122. The resolution provides as follows:
"The notices to be given to the guarantors for the, preservation
of the rights of recourse in case of default of acceptance of payment,
and the time within which such notices must be given, are governed
by the law of the cointry from which such notices must be sent."
152a. N. I. L. Sec. 81, 113, 147, 159; B. E. A. Secs. 46 (1), 50 (1),
39 (4), 51 (9).
153. N. I. L. Secs. 82 (1), 112, 148 (2), 159; B. E. A. Secs. 46 (2) (a),
50 (2) (a), 41 (2) (b) 51 (9).
154. Art. 53, Uniform Law. The German Bills of Exchange Law of
1849 does not excuse any delay on account of vis major. Staub, Art.
41. Sec. 3.
155. Von Bar, p. 684; Champcommunal, Annales, 1894- II, p. 218;
Chr6tien, pp. 184-185; Despagnet, "p. 996; Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV,
p. 567; Ottolenghi, p. 430; Surville et Arthuys, p. 686; Weiss, IV, pp.
463-64.
156. Diena, III, pp. 183, 185; Jitta, II, p. 139; Mass6, I, pp 569-70.
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caused by vis major should be controlled by the law of the place
of payment of the bill or note. The Institute of International Law
considers the law of the place of the original issue of the instru-
ment to be the appropriate law. 57
The principle of the independence of the different contracts
on a bill or note makes it impossible to accept the view recom-
mended by the Institute of International Law, for there is no
reasonable basis for the assumption that the different parties
contracted with reference to the lex loci contractus of the draw-
er's contract as regards the defense now under consideration. The
defenses which each party can interpose in an action against him
are controlled by the lex loci contractus of the individual contract,
except when they relate to the nature of the interpretation of the
original contract or to the mode of performance. As the defense
of vis major has no connection with the nature of interpretation
of the original bill or note, it will be controlled necessarily by the
lex loci contractus of each contract unless it can be said to belong
to the incidents of performance. When the vis major operates to
excuse presentment, protest or notice altogether, the question re-
lates clearly to the substance of the obligation of the different con-
tracts, that is, to the conditions upon which the parties assumed
liability, and is controlled, therefore, by the law governing their
respective contracts. On the other hand, when the vis major is
relied upon solely for the purpose of excusing a delay in the pre-
sentment, protest or notice, it would seem that the law of the
place where the acts are to be done should control the question.
This law determines the precise day on which these acts must be
done with respect to days of grace, Sundays and holidays, and
the time for protesting in general, and should control whenever
conditions constituting .vis major under the law of such state
exist.
b. Moratory Laws. Does the rule governing the defense of
vis major apply where by reason of some great public necessity
or calamity the time of payment or the time for protesting the
instrument is postponed by legislation? This question has been
discussed a great deal as a result of the French moratory legisla-
tion during the Franco-Prussian war. There can be no doubt
concerning the validity of such legislation as regards persons
who were subject to French law. Most of the countries -up-
held the French legislation even with respect to foreign in-
157. Annuaire, VIII, p. 122, Resolution VI.
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dorsers.'5 s A vast literature has arisen upon the subject which
has been collected in Goldschmidt's Zeitschrift ffir das gesammte
Handelsrecht. 159 Much of the controversy arose from the nature
of the specific legislation involved, which postponed the time of
payment of bills payable in France from month to month for a
period aggregating eleven months. The legislation spoke now
of the postponement of the maturity, now of the postponement
of the time for protesting, and finally forbade the protesting.
No attempt will be made here to discuss the French legislation.
The problem can be considered only in its general aspects. Where
the noratory legislation takes the form of an extension of the
time within which presentment and protest may be made, it has
been contended with great force that the law of the place of pay-
ment oI the bill or note should control by virtue of the rule uni-
versally recognized as regards days of grace. G° Diena l "0 holds
the view that the day of maturity remains unaffected by such
mo:'rat ." legislation as the French and that there has been in
reality onlv "'a postponement of the day on which payment can
be demanded." Von Bar,6 2 maintains, on the other hand, that "it
is merely playing with words to say that days of grace may just
as well last for seven or eleven months as for two to ten days."
The writer agrees with the view that the law of the place of pay-
ment of a bill or note should govern with respect to the moratory
legislation of the type now under consideration. Days of grace
exist on grounds of policy whose object is the protection of the
158. England: Rouquettc v. Overman, (1875) L. R. 10 Q.'B.-525.
Austr-a: OGH May 28 & June 13, 1872, cited by Jettel, p. 119. See
also Austro-Hungarian Court at Constantinople, Apr. 15, 1872 (1
Clunet 100). Belgium: Brussels, Apr. 29, 1872 (1 Clunct 209) Ghent,
May 15. 1873 (1 Clunet 213). France: App. Aix Apr. 9, 1872 (D. 1872.
2. 202). Italy: Cass. Turin, March 6, 1872 (Annali 1872. 1. 107); App.
Rome, June 12, 1872 (Annali 1872. 2. 266); Cass. Florence, Jan. 16.
1873 (Annali 1873. 1. 47); App. Milan, Apr. 4, 1873 (1 Clunet 138);
Ctss. Turin, May 20, 1879 (Annali 1897. 1. 405). Sweden: Sup. Court
of Sweden, May 14, 1873 (1 Clunet 149). Switzerland: Court of
Geneva. March 25, 1872 (Rev. de Dr. Int. 1872, p. 660).
A few courts, however, reached a different co,,clusion, notably the
Supreme Commercial Court of the German Bund in its decision of
February 21, 1871 (1 ROHG 288); also App. Milan, April 16, 1872 (An-
nali 1872. 2. 139).
159. XVII. pp. 294-09, XVIII, pp. 625-43.
160. That days of grace may be allowed by the law of the place of
payment after the contract of the drawer or indorser has been entered
into. is generally conceded. Von Bar, p. 683, note; Chr6tien, p. 192;
Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 568.
161. Diena, III, p. 189; Principi, II, pp. 316-17.
162. P. 683.
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debtor against the serious consequences of loss of credit, imme-
diate execution and possible bankruptcy which may follow upon
the dishonor of commercial paper. Moratory laws aim to pro-
tect the credit or financial interests of a nation in the case of
public crisis by giving to its people time within which to pay
obligations which are conceded to be due. The difference in the
length of time during which such grace is allowed cannot affect
the principle.16
3
The law of the place of payment should govern equally when
the moratory legislation prohibits the protesting of bills and
notes during a specified period. Such legislation creates a situa-
tion of vis major operating merely as an extension of the time
within which the protest can be made. In accordance with the or-
dinary rules governing vis major which have been laid down
above, the law of the place of payment of a bill or note should
control.1 64
The moratory legislation should be regarded as invalid, how-
ever, if it takes the form of an extension of the date of maturity.
Even in the absence of constitutional limitations no state can be
regarded as having the power to effectuate such a change in the
contract of the parties, except with respect to persons that arie
subject to its jurisdiction. The legislation cannot bind parties
to bills and notes who assumed their obligations in a foreign
country.8 5 Some of the writers are of the opinion that even
in this case the legislation might be sustained on the theory that
it constitutes, so far as the holder is concerned, a case of vis
major.Y6 In order that a cise of vis major in any true sense
can be made out, the protesting of th'e instrument on the day of
its original maturity must be rendered impossible, or at least
illegal. If a protest can be lawfully made on the day of the origi-
nal maturity of the bill or note, there is no reason why the holder
who wants to preserve his right or recourse against a foreign
drawer or indorser should not make the presentment and protest
in accordance with the strict terms of the contract of such
drawer or indorser. When the moratory legislation purporting
163. Diena, III, pp. 190-91. See also Ottolenghi, p. 436; Despagnet,
p. 997; Weiss, IV. p. 466.
164. Chr~tien, p. 192;.Despagnet, pp. 997-98; Lyon-Caen et Renault,
IV, p. 568.
165. Chr~tien, p. 193; Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 568.
166. Weiss IV, p. 466, note; Chanipcommunal, Annales, 1894, II, p.
250.
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to extend the date of maturity allows a recovery of interest from
the original date of maturity the substance of the contract would
not, in reality, be affected but solely the time and mode of its
performance, so that the law of the place of payment of the bill or
note should govern. 16
7
The English case of Rouquette v. Overman,'8 which sus-
tained the French legislation, gives three reasons for the applica-
tion of the law of the place of payment of a bill or note. First-
the question affects the "incidents of presentment and payment"
and is subject, therefore, to the law of the place of payment. Sec-
ond-the indorser's contract calls for performance at the place of
payment of the bill or note and is controlled therefore by that law.
Third-a contrary doctrine, which might allow recourse against
the drawer and indorsers before the obligation of the principal
debtor has become due, would constitute a startling anomaly.
In an earlier part of this article it has been shown that the
contract of the drawer and indorser is one of indemnity, which
is to be performed in the place where it is entered into and not
at the place of payment of the bill or note. The second ground
set forth in the above opinion cannot, therefore, be accepted.
The third argument, namely, that the application of the lex loci
contractus of the different parties would lead to the anomaly that
recourse might be taken against the drawer and the indorsers
before the obligation of the principal debtor has become due, is
of no conclusive character, as anomalies, in the nature of things,
must result from such anomalous legislation. The extent to
which the reason first advanced, namely, that the question affects
the incidents of presentment and payment, can be accepted, has
been shown above.
There is no reasonable basis for the assumption that all parties
contracted with reference to the lex loci contractus of the original
contract and for that reason the recommendation of the Institute
of International Law, which favors that rule,169 must be disap-
proved.
S. PAYMENT.
There is perfect agreement in the law of the different coun-
tries concerning the rule governing the mode of payment. In the
167. Diena, III, pp. 189-90. See also Jitta, II, p. 140.
168. (1875) L. R. 10 Q. B. 525.
169. Annuaire VIII, p. 122, Resolution VI.
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nature of things the law of the place of payment controls. 'Unless
the bill.or note specifies that payment is to be made in a particu-
lar coin, the law of the place of payment will determine the kind
of currency in which the instrument may be paid.
7 0
The above rule is regarded as controlling also certain other
matters relating to payment; for example, whether a party liable
on a bill. or note may discharge his liability by payment of the
amount into court, 17 ' and when payment through a clearing
house 7 2 becomes irrevocable.
Shall the same rule be applied also where the amount of a
bill or note is indicated in a kind of money having the same desig-
nation in the country of issue and in the country where the pay-
ment is to be made, but there is a difference in its value? Sup-
pose, for example, that a bill is drawn in New York on the city
of Mexico for $1,000. If the bill calls for Mexican dollars it
will represent only half the value it would possess if it were inter-
preted to mean dollars of the United States. Most authors 73 an-
swer the question in the affirmative. Others 74 maintain that the
law of the place of payment controls only the mode of payment,
and that the question under consideration relates to the interpreta-
tion of the principal contract. The law of the place of payment is
adopted as the governing law by the Convention of the Hague,'1
7 5
and this law would appear to be entitled to preference. As the
amount is payable at the place of payment it would seem as if
the money current at such a place must have been intended by
the parties, in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary.
All parties to the instrument must be regarded as having con-
170. Diena, Principi, II, pp. 253-54; Audinet, p. 616; Jitta, II, p. 110;
Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 554; Ottolenghi, pp.. 305-06; Surville et
Arthuys, pp. 682-83; Valry, p. 1287; Weiss, IV, p. 466.
Many authors would apply the same rule though paper money
has been substituted as legal tender since the making of the contract.
Chr6tien, pp. 159-62; Ottolenghi, pp. 313-14; Surville et Arthuys, pp.
682-83.
171. Diena, III, p. 154; Grfinhut, II, p. 585; Lyon-Caen et Renault,
IV, 563.
172. Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 563.
173. Von Bar, p. 674; Esperson, p. 97; Fiore, I, p. 223; Lyon-Caen
et Renault, IV, p. 262; Masse, I, p. 546; Rolin, II, p. 543. See also,
Ottolenghi, pp. 308-09.
174. Champcommunal, Annales, 1894, II, p. 208; Chrtien, p. 153;
Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 262; Surville et Arthuys, p. 676.
!75. Art. 40, par. 2, Uniform Law.
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tracted upon this basis, so that the question is unaffected by the
lex loci contractus of the drawer's or indorser's contract." 6
Under the Convention of the Hague the holder of a bill of
exchange must accept partial payment.7 According to Anglo-
American law he is not required to do so. It has been suggested
that the duty of the holder in this regard should be regarded as
relating not to the mode of payment but to the obligation of the
different contracts and should be governed, therefore, by the lex
loci contractus of each contract.'78 This view point would lead,
however, to totally impracticable results and must be rejected, if
for no other reason, on that ground alone. The holder must either
accept part payment or not accept it, and he is not in a position
to comply with conflicting laws. One law must control, and in-
asmuch as the question relates to payment the law of the place
of payment is the logical rule to adopt. 9
9. AMOUNT OF RECOVERY.
Much conflict may arise with respect to the amount of recov-
ery. Anglo-American law differs from that of the Hague Con-
vention in that it does not allow a commission, nor a deduction
for a discount where suit is brought before maturity. The Eng-
lish law on the subject of damages was settled by the Bills of Ex-
change Act. In this country great uncertainty continues to exist
with regard to the amount of recovery not only in the matter of
damages (re-exchange, charges and expenses) but also as re-
gards the principal amount specified in the instrument.'"0 The
Negotiable Instruments Law has not attempted to regulate the
subject. In many states fixed damages are prescribed by statute
in lieu of the ordinary damages, charges and expenses.
In the light of such conflicting rules in the municipal law,
which is the rule which shall control the rights of the -holder in
the Conflict of Laws.
(a) English Law: Before the Bills of Exchange Act the Eng-
lish law governing interest and damages for the non-fulfillment
of the contract of the maker and acceptor, drawer and indorser,
176. Ottolenghi, p. 311.
177. Art. 38, par. 2, Uniform Law. The Convention permits each
contracting state, however, to authorize the holder to refuse partial
payment of instruments payable within its own territory. Art. 8 of
Convention.
178. Diena, III, p. 156; Ottolenghi, pp. 303-04.
179. Chr6tien, p. 173; Esperson, p. 107.
180. See Norton on Bills and Notes, 4th edition, pp. 229-35.
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was that of the place where each party undertook that he himself
would pay.""- The matter is now covered substantially by Sec-
tion 57 of the Act. Although subdivision 1 of Section 57 is
couched in general terms,' 82 it appears to apply only to bills dis-
honored in England. 3  The subdivision is not exhaustive, how-
ever. A foreign drawer of a bill dishonored in England by non-
payment, who has paid re-exchange, may recover it from the Eng-
lish acceptor, and, if he is liable for re-exchange, may prove it in
bankruptcy against the acceptor's estate before actual pay-
ment. 8 4  Where the bill is dishonored in England and the ac-
tion is brought in an English court 8 5 not only indorsers in Eng-
land but also persons who indorsed the instrument abroad would
appear to be subject to the above provisions. Where the bill is
dishonored abroad, subdivision 2 of Section 57 of the Bills of
Exchange Act applies. 8 6
(b) American Law: The lex loci solutionis governs both as to
interest and damages. 8 7 As the contracts of the drawer and in-
dorsers are regarded as independent contracts, according to which
these parties do not agree to pay at the place of payment of the
bill or note, interest and damages as against them are determined
by the lex loci contractus et solutionis of their respective con-
181. Cooper v. Earl of Waldegrave, (1840) 2 Beav. 282: Gibbs v.
Fremont, (1853) 9 Exch. 25. See also Chalmers, pp. 244-45; Dicey,
pp. 598-99; Mayne, Damages, Sec. 308.
182. Section 57. of the Bills of Exchange Act, subdivision 1, pro-
vides as follows: "The holder may recover from any party liable on
the bill, and the drawer who has been compelled to pay the bill may
recover from the acceptor, and an indorser who has been compelled
to pay the bill may recover from the acceptor, or from the drawer,
or from a prior indorser-(a) The amount of the bill; (b) interest
thereon from the time of presentment for payment if the bill is pay-
able on demand, and from the maturity of the bill in any other case;
(c) the expenses of noting, or, when protest is necessary, and the pro-
test has been extended, the expenses of protest."
183. Chalmers, p. 195.
184. Ex parte Roberts, (1886) L. R. 182. B. D. 286 (C. A.), 56
L. J. Q. B. 74, 56 L. T. 599; 35 W. R. 128. See also Chalmers, p.
195; Dicey, p. 599.
185. Dicey, p. 599.
186. Section 57, subdivision 2 of the Bills of Exchange Act pro-
vides: "In the case of a bill which has been dishonoured abroad, in
lieu of the above damages, the holder may recover from the drawer,
or an indorser, and the drawer or an indorser who has been compelled
to pay the bill may recover from any party liable to him, the amount
of the re-exchange with interest thereon until the time of payment."
187. Scofield v. Day, (1822) 20 Johns, (N. Y.) 102; Hawley v. Sloo,
(1857) 12 La. Ann. 815; Austin v. Imus, (1851) 23 Vt. 286.
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tracts. s8 The same rule applies where a fixed amount is pay-
able by way of damages in lieu of re-exchange charges and
expenses.8 9
(c) French Law: Interest by way of damages is recoverable
in accordance with the lex fori.'9
(d) German Law: The amount of recovery by the holder and
by the indorsers who may have taken up the bill, is specified in
Articles 50 and 51 of the General German Exchange Law. Sub-
division 1 of each of these sections allows interest at the rate of
six per cent from the date of maturity or payment, and subdi-
vision 3, a commission of one-third per cent. According to
Article 52 the provisions of Articles 50 and 51, subdivisions 1
and 3, do not exclude "in cases of recourse on a foreign place,
the higher rates permissible at such place." Though
Article 52 refers specifically to the foreign law only when it
prescribes higher rates than are laid down by the German law,
th.e principle underlying the provision is deemed to have a gen-
eral operation.191
A thorough discussion of the subject of damages would cover
many pages and cannot be undertaken in this place and only
the principal points of view can be mentioned.
First view. Thelaw of the forum should govern. This view
has been accepted by Massachusetts as regards interest by way
oi damages '1 2 and also by the French Court of Cassation.' :-
The doctrine is condemned by all modern jurists because it rests
upon the false theory that non-contractual interest arises from the
institution of the action, instead of from the non-performance of
the contract.
188. Slacun v. Pomeroy, (1810) 6 Cranch. (U. S.) 221, 3 L. Ed. 205;
Ex parte Heidelback, (1876) 2 Lowell 526. Fed. Cas. No. 6322: Craw-
ford v. Branch Bank of Mobile, (1844) 6 Ala. 12, 41 Am. Dec. 33;
Bailey v. Heald, (1856) 17 Tex. 102.
A few courts hold that the drawers and indorsers agree to pay
at the place of payment of the bill of note. Bank of Illinois v.
Brady, (1843) 3 McLean 268, Fed. Cas. No. 888; Mullen v. Morris,
(1845) 2 Pa. 85; Peck v. Mayo, (1842) 14 Vt. 33, 39 Am. Dec. 205.
189. Slacum v. Pomeroy, (1810) 6 Cranch. (U. S.) 221, 3 L. Ed.
205; Lenning v. Ralston, (1854) 23 Pa. 137.
190. Cass. 'June 10, 1657 (S. 1859. 1. 751), cited by Weiss, IV, p. 391.
note; Cass. April 13, 1885 (13 Clunet 459).
191. See von Bar, p. 682; Diena, III, p. 211, note; Griinhut, II, p. 580,
note 40.
192. Ayer v. Tilden, (1860) 15 Gray (Mass.) 178, 77 Am. Dec. 355.
193. Cass. June 10, 1857 (S. 1859. 1. 751), cited by Weiss, IV, p. 391,
note; Cass. April 13, 1885 (13 Clunet 459). -
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Second view. The law of the place of performance should
control. This view is held by the majority of countries and jur-
ists. The old writers reached the result by reason of the applica-
tion of the distinction which they made between the direct and
indirect effects of a contract.9 Under the intention theory,
which underlies the modern law of obligations in the Conflict of
Laws, the above conclusion is generally justified upon the ground
that inasmuch as the breach occurred at the place where the pay-
ment is due, the parties must be deemed to have that law in
mind. 1' 5
Third view. The law of the place where the contract is
entered into should determine the question. A number of writers
maintain that there is no sufficient basis for a distinction between
contractual and non-contractual interest. According to these
writers the non-performance of the contract must have been also
within the contemplation of the parties and should be governed,
therefore, by the lex loci contractus,-the law controlling .the
obligation of the contract19 1
The writer is not convinced of the correctness of the reason-
ing just stated. From the mere fact that the law may assume,a
in the absence of evidence -to the contrary, that the parties con-
tracted with reference to the law of the place where the contract
is entered into, it does not follow that all matters touching the
obligation of the contract must be controlled by that law. We
have seen that by common consent all matters relating directly
to the mode of performance are subject to the law of the state
where the performance is to take place. And it would seem most
natural to assume that where the contract is broken by non-
performance, the amount of interest due by way of damages
should be determined by the rate prevailing at the place agreed
upon for performance. The value of the performance at the
time and place of performance controls generally the measure of
damages in the municipal law for the reason that this rule com-
pensates the plaintiff most nearly for the actual loss sustained.
The same rule should govern in the Conflict of Laws. And this
rule should control not only with reference to non-contractual in-
terest but also with respect to the question of damages in general.
194. See, for example, Boullenois, Trait6 de ]a Personnalit6 et de la
Ralit6 des Loix, II, pp. 477 fg.
195. Von Bar, pp. 584-85; Fiore, III, p. 258; Weiss. IV, pp. 391-92.
196. Asser, p. 81; Diena, II, pp. 81-84; Diena, III, p. 209: Ottolenghi,
p. 469.
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In the law of bills and notes the question remains, however,
whether the damages should be determined as regards all parties
by one and -the same law. A number of authors are of this
opinion, notwithstanding the doctrine of independence of the dif-
ferent contracts which they approve in general, and hold that the
law of the place of payment of the bill or note should control? 97
They advocate this rule on grounds of convenience in order that
the right of recourse between the parties may be adjusted more
harmoniously than it is possible to do if the measure of damages
with respect to each party is subject to the lex loci contractus of
his particular contract. The Institute of International Law
desired to reach the same end but was unwilling to sacrifice the
doctrine of the independence of the different contracts in the
matter of damages. It resolved, therefore, that while the dif-
ferent contracts are to be governed by the law of the state in
which each contract is entered into, the obligation of the con-
tracts placed upon the bill or note after its inception, should not be
more extensive than that of the drawer or maker, respectively.'9 8
In this way it was sought to prevent the possibility that a party
to a bill or note might be held without having a right to recover
the full amount from the party creating the -instrument. To
the writer the solution of the problem suggested by the Institute
of International- Law appears wholly impracticable, and if uni-
formity in the amount of damages must be attained at all costs,
he would prefer the law of the place of payment of the bill- or
note as the law governing non-contractual interest and damages
with respect to all parties. He is of opinion, however, that the
doctrine of the independence of the different contracts should not
be abandoned in the matter of damages. In strict theory, as has
been pointed out by Dean Ames, 99 the interest payable by the
drawer or indorser in fulfillment of his contract of indemnity
should run from the dishonor of the instrument to the time when
it should, according to mercantile custom, be presented to the
drawer or indorser, and ought to be computed at the rate pre-
vailing at the place of dishonor; while interest payable by the
drawer or indorser by way of damages for the non-fulfillment of
his contract of indemnity should run only from the presentment
197. Von Bar, p. 681; Champeommunal. Annales, 1894,I, p. 259;
Chr~tien, p. 213: Esperson, p. 75; Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 561;
Val6ry, p. 1288; Weiss, IV, p. 467.
198. Annuaire, VIII, p. 121.
199. Ames, Cases on Bills and Notes, II, pp. 819-20.
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of the instrument to the drawer or indorser and his failure to
pay, and should be computed according to the rate prevailing at
the place where the contract of the drawer or indorser is to be
performed. This distinction is not made, however, by the Ameri-
can cases.
10. ACCEPTANCE AND PAYMENT FOR HONOR.
Considerable difference exists in matters of detail between
the Anglo-American law and that of the Convention of the Hague
as regards acceptance and payment for honor. The principles of
the Conflict of Laws that should control the questions which
may arise from such a difference in the municipal law, would ap-
pear to be plain. In conformity with the conclusions reached in
this article the contract of the acceptor for honor, as regards his
capacity, the form of the contract, and the nature, conditions and
extent of his liability assumed should be subject to the law of the
place where the contract is entered into. The duty of the holder
of a bill of exchange to allow acceptance for honor, and the effect
of such acceptance upon his rights against the different parties to
the instrument should be governed, on the other hand, by the
lex loci contractus of the different parties. -"0 This law deter-
mines likewise the duty of the holder to accept payment for
honor when such payment for honor is offered at the maturity of
the instrument, or subsequent thereto, and the conditions under
which he is authorized to do so.2 ' As regards the form in which
payment for honor must be made, and the procedure to be fol-
lowed, the law of the place where such payment for honor is
made naturally controls.2 02
11. RF.-vor.
All of the aforementioned rules must be understood as re-
ferring to the municipal law of the locus contractus, locus solu-
tionis, etc., and not to the law of the state or country in its to-
tality inclusive of its rules of the Conflict of Laws. The circum-
stance that the law of the place of contracting or of the place of
performance may have another rule of private international law
governing capacity, the formal validity or the obligation of the
different contracts is therefore of no consequence.
The courts do not always bear this fact in mind. The follow-
200. Diena, III, pp. 128-29; Jittam, II, p. 124; Ottolenghi, p. 207.
201. Diena, III, pp. 157-58; Ottolenghi, p. 330.
202. Diena, 111, p. 159.
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ing quotation from the opinion of Judge Sanborn in Guernsey
v. Imperial Bank of Canada"3 may serve as an illustration:
"This is an action by the owner of a promissory note payable
in Canada made and indorsed in Illinois to recover the amount
due upon the note from the indorser. Presentihent, demand and
protest were made, and notice of dishonor was given in compli-
ance with the law of Canada, but the indorser claims, and it is
conceded, but neither admitted nor decided, that the notice would
have been insufficient to charge the indorser if the note had been
payable in Illinois. The court below held that the notice was good
and rendered a judgment against the indorser. The latter's coun-
sel insist that this ruling is error on the ground that the sufficiency
of the notice is governed by the law of the place of indorsement,
and not by the law of the place of payment. To this contention
there is a short and conclusive answer. The place of the indorse-
ment was the state of Illinois. The law of that state was, when
the indorsement was made, and it still is, that when commercial
paper is indorsed in one jurisdiction and is payable in another
the law of the place where it is payable governs the time and
mode of presentment for payment, the manner of protest, and the
time and manner of giving notice of dishonor, and the law of the
place of indorsement is inapplicable to them. Wooley v. Lyon,
117 Ill. 248, 250, 6 N. E. 885, 886, 57 Am. Rep. 867. If, there-
fore, as counsel contend, the law of the place where the indorse-
ient was made, the law of Illinois, governs the sufficiency of the
notice of dishonor in this case, that notice was good, for it was
sufficient under the law of Canada where the note was payable,
and the law of Illinois was that in a case of this character the
law of the place where the note was payable governed the time
and manner of giving the notice of dishonor."
The portion of the quotation which has been printed in
italics accepts, in fact, the so-called renvoi doctrine, which, if
generally adopted in the Conflict of Laws. would lead to great
confusion. Counsel argued that the law of the place of indorse-
ment, which was Illinois, should control the sufficiency of notice.
The court's answer is that even if, for the sake of argument,
counsel's contention be granted, the notice would be sufficient
because it satisfied the law of the place of payment, that is, the
law which would govern the question according to the rule of
the Conflict of Laws adopted in Illinois. The viciousness of the
reasoning consists in the fact that the law of the place of indorse-
ment, for the application of which counsel contended, was under-
stood by the court as including the Conflict of Laws of the state
of Illinois instead of merely its law of bills and notes. The
203. (1911) 188 Fe d. 300, at p. 301.
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fundamental question raised is whether the rules of the Con-
flict of Laws should be understood as referring the judge to
the municipal law of the foreign state or country, exclusive of its
rules of the Conflict of Laws, or to the law of such state or
country in its totality. In another place ""'1 it has been shown that
all Conflict of Laws rules should be understood in the former
sense. A court adopting the view that the rules of the Conflict
of Laws referred to the law of the foreign state or country in its
totality gives up, in fact, its own convictions on the subject of
the Conflict of Laws and yields to the superior wisdom of the
courts of another state. Unless the rules of the Conflict of Laws
administered by the courts of the forum are understood as refer-
ring to the municipal law of the foreign state, that is, in the pres-
ent instance, to its law of bills and notes, instead of to the law
of that state in its totality, inclusive of its rules governing the
Conflict of Laws, the courts of each state might be compelled to
administer as many systems of the Conflict of Laws as are in
existence in the whole world. The only sound and practical
view is that all rules of the Conflict of Laws be understood as re-
ferring to the municipal law of a foreign state, exclusive of its
rules of the Conflict of Laws.
12. CoNcLUSION.
The following is a brief summary of the conclusions reached
in the foregoing study.
(a) The capacity to contract by bill or note is determined by
the lex loci contractus.
(b) The formal or essential validity of a bill or note is de-
termined by the lex loci contractus. Where a bill or note, issued
out of the United States, or any supervening contract placed
thereon out of the United States, conforms as regards requisites
in form to the law of the United States, it may, for the purpose
of enforcing payment thereof, be treated as valid as between all
persons who negotiate, hold, or become parties to it in the United
States.
(c) The interpretation and obligation of the drawing, in-
dorsement, making. acceptance. or acceptance supra protest of a
bill or note is determined by the law of the place where such con-
tract is made.
204. See 10 Columbia Law Review, pp. 190-207, 327-44. For the lit-




(1) That where an instrument is a negotiable bill or note
under the law of its place of issue, it shall be deemed negoti-
able with respect to all parties.
(2) That a title to a negotiable bill or note acquired in
conformity with the law of the place of transfer shall be recog-
nized with respect to all parties.
(d) Where a bill or note is drawn in one country and is
payable in another, the due date thereof is determined according
to the law of the place where it is payable.
(e) The sufficiency of the presentment for acceptance or
payment and of the protest is determined by the law of the
place where the bill or note is dishonored.
(f) The sufficiency of the notice of dishonor is determined
by the law of the place from which such notice must be given.
(g) All of the above rules are to be understood as referring
to the municipal law of the foreign- state, exclusive of its rules
of the Conflict of Laws.
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